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I. Introduction
The aim in this volume is to present a series of case studies to illustrate
how the accumulation of basic knowledge in psychology has led to information
of applied value; the particular charge of this chapter is to consider develop-
mental memory research in this light. Traditionally there has been a division
between basic and applied developmental research, and the majority of research
reviewed and described in this chapter would be regarded as basic since it is
laboratory inspired and conducted. Its origins are firmly based in theoretical
and empirical backgrounds rather than practical problems raised in an applied
setting. As such, the problem of practical application is more difficult for
the basic researcher as his studies, at their inception, are rarely intended
to answer specific applied questions. Nonetheless, while the possibility of
practical application is of more central interest for the applied researcher,
the topic cannot and should not be avoided by those concerned with basic
research.
The task is made somewhat easier in the case of the development of memory
strategies as several of the leading proponents in the field have been con-
tinually motivated by the combined purposes of addressing theoretical problems
and, at the same time, applying information of practical significance directly
in the form of training techniques to enhance performance. Classroom applica-
tions have been discussed and attempts to design curricula which embody the
successful features of basic training studies are already under way in several
laboratories (e.g., Ross & Ross, 1972). Thus, the ties between the laboratory
of the basic researcher and the practical needs of the classroom teacher are
less nebulous than has traditionally been the link between developmental
psychology as a science and education practice as a problem of cognitive
engineering.
In this chapter, we will attempt to illustrate how basic research can
inform educational practice and vice versa. To do this we will progress
chronologically, giving first a brief encapsulation of the history of basic
research in the area of memory development. As this brief overview is intended
to provide a broad historical perspective, procedural details will be omitted.
So that the complexities of such procedures can be appreciated, we will next
examine in more detail a series of case studies that illustrate the progress
and problems of a few prototypical research programs. This will be followed
by a description of the progress, problems and practical significance of
attempts to devise effective training techniques aimed at overcoming the
inadequacies of the immature learner. Finally, we will attempt to describe
what would seem to be some practical steps for training in the laboratory and
in the classroom, given the current state of our basic knowledge concerning
the young child as a memorizer.
Before proceeding we should point out the limited focus of this chapter.
It would be impossible to cover the wide variety of research areas which could
be subsumed under its heading. Because of our focus on potentially applicable
knowledge we have limited our attention to a certain class of situations, those
that deal with deliberate attempts to learn or remember, although we realize
that much of what one knows is not the result of deliberate attempts to retain
information. The child's knowledge of the world around him, of the people,
places, and things that occupy his everyday world, is the more or less auto-
matic product of this continuous interaction with a meaningful environment.
This will not be a concern in this chapter. Here we will concentrate exclu-
sively on the development of deliberate actions to facilitate the retention
of information, actions or skills we must master if we are to survive in
schools. The natural development, susceptibility to training, and potential
application of these skills to study situations will be the central concern.
We concentrate on the development of strategies for remembering because
considerable experimentation has been directed to both the development of
this form of problem-solving activity and the refinement of techniques for
accelerating that development by means of direct training, intervention and
enrichment programs. We should stress, however, that we make no distinction
between learning and memory. Obviously, we measure what is learned by how
much is remembered. Additionally, we do not believe that the knowledge we
have is limited to a strict domain labelled "how to remember". Deliberate
remembering is just one example of intelligent planning, and many of the
difficulties which underly the young child's problems with remembering are
also behind his general deficiencies as an active problem solver on school-
related tasks. Memory skills are specialized problem-solving activities
tailored to the purpose of reconstructing past events; they are not different
in kind from problem-solving skills in general.
As a final introductory comment we would like to defend our concentration
on experimental work with slow-learning children. Children with marginal
academic skills, which render them at risk for special education, are found to
experience particular problems in two main areas: strategic planning in school
problem-solving tasks (including deliberate remembering) and reading effectively.
Our interest in developing training routines to overcome some of these de-
ficiencies stems from our belief that remediation aimed at marginal children
can be the most fruitful in terms of obtaining worthwhile educational improve-
ments. It also reflects our belief that average children acquire many of the
skills we will consider without explicit training; repeated contact with a
variety of tasks in school, all requiring the same basic strategies, is
probably sufficient to inculcate at least the very simple strategies we will
describe. Slow learning children, however, need direct and explicit training
before they will acquire the skills; without intervention they may never
acquire them (Brown,1977; Campione & Brown,1977).
II. History of Basic Developmental Research in Memory
Since the inception of experimental child p.chology as a scientific
discipline with some degree of external recognition and internal cohesion, a
great deal of research effort has been directed to the problem of learning
and memory in children. Thus, any history of that research must be only a
very superficial guide to progress in the field. Secondary sources are
available to elaborate on this impoverished outline and the reader is referred
to a series of recent chapters by Flavell (1970), Brown (1975, 1977), and
Hagen, Jongeward, and Kail (1975). Here we will give only an indication of
the major trends, the motivations behind each trend, and the current state
of the art.
A) Capacity Differences
Although children's memory was a topic of interest even for the very
early experimentalists (Binet & Henri, 1894; Binet, 1904; Galton, 1887;
Hunter, 1917), concentrated attention on this topic did not become part of
the mainstream of psychological research until the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The majority of these early studies on the development of memory can be
crudely categorized as demonstration studies of "capacity" differences, i.e.,
the older we get the greater memory capacity we have. It was readily shown
that on a variety of tasks, older children remembered more than younger
children, and slow learners had more difficulty remembering than did those
of average ability, hardly a surprising result. The predominant explanation
was simply that immature learners have a limited memory capacity and as they
mature this capacity increases, allowing them to retain more. The underlying
metaphor is clearly a container metaphor; little people have little storage
boxes or jars in the head but bigger people have more room. Any demonstration
of inferior performance on the part of the developmentally young, and such
demonstrations were readily obtainable, "proved" this point.
Needless to say, the problem turned out to be somewhat more complex and
it did not take long (even for psychology) for researchers to realize that
certain reservations must be added. For example, the nature of the material
that would be placed in the memory container was important. If the material
was interesting to the child, or reinforced his preexisting beliefs, it was
retained much better. Even very young children have excellent memories for
certain categories of information, for example, real-world environments,
location of objects, concentration-like games, nursery rhymes, familiar songs,
Sesame Street chants, etc. (Brown, 1975). The anecdotal accounts of parents
concerning the longevity of toddlers' memory for familiar people, places and
things appear to be factual (Huttenlocher, 1975). In addition, memory differ-
ences across levels of maturity could not simply be accounted for by differences
in the size of the memory container for if all that is required is recognition
of past events, or familiar objects, young children's memory is extremely
efficient, possibly not less efficient than that of adults (Brown, 1975).
Even young babies show excellent recognition of pictures (Cohen & Gelber, 1975).
So much for a simple capacity notion, and therefore the utility of simple
demonstration studies. We knew that children remembered less well than adults,
except when theyremembered as much or more. The question became, when and
under what conditions do children perform poorly, rather than do they perform
in general less well than adults.
B) Mnemonic Strategies
The mainstream of research during the 1960s and early 1970s was dominated
by attempts to classify the common features of situations where the develop-
mentally young routinely performed very poorly compared to adults. Situations
meeting these criteria required that the child actively participate in a
deliberate attempt to memorize, and usually demanded verbatim recall of
impersonal material, often lists of items out of context. In order to perform
efficiently on such tasks the memorizer must introduce a mnemonic strategy
of some kind; for example, he might say the items over and over (rehearse
them); he might elaborate the material so that it fits into a meaningful
context (e.g., make up a story to embed the items); or he might look for
redundancies, repeated elements or categories of information to reduce the
memory load. Remembering there were four animals in a list of words will help
retrieve the actual items; noting the repetition in the sequence 3 4 9 3 4 9
will reduce the load by half; noting that 1 4 9 2 1 7 7 6 1 9 4 1 is not simply
a list of 12 arbitrarily chosen numbers, but rather three very well-known
historical dates will make the list easily retainable. All these strategies
help the deliberate memorizer make more efficient use of a limited ability
for verbatim recall.
A mnemonic strategy can be broadly defined as any course of action which
is deliberately instigated for the purpose of remembering. By means of various
mnemonic schemes, material is organized, transformed, or maintained in such a
way that a more efficient use of a limited capacity memory system is ensured.
Thus, the main feature of a mnemonic strategy is that it is not essential for
task performance but is a voluntary plan adopted by the memorizer for cognitive
economy, a plan which is deliberately introduced for the goal of remembering.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, developmental psychologists focused
on the development of strategies of deliberate remembering to the virtual
exclusion of other forms of memory. The simplest statement concerning the
state of the art was one made by Flavell (1970), that if a mnemonic strategy
is required for efficient performance on a task, developmental differences
will be obtained. Brown (1975) added the corollary that when the need for
such strategies is minimal, the task will be relatively insensitive to
developmental trends. Reviews of the literature have amply documented that
the deliberate control of what to remember and what to forget, together with
the strategic use of various tactics to aid these processes, is inadequate
in the developmentally young. There seems a general consensus that the degree
to which some deliberate mnemonic strategy is required will determine the
extent to which developmentally-related differences in performance will occur.
As the child matures, he gradually acquires a basic repertoire of these skills,
which emerge first as isolated task dependent actions but gradually evolve into
flexible, generalizable skills (Brown, 1975, 1977; Meacham, 1977; Smirnov &
Zinchenko, 1969). With extensive use, strategic intervention may become so
dominant that it takes on many of the characteristics of automatic and
unconscious processing, in that only intensive introspective questioning can
reveal the operations of the strategic device even to the operator. The use
of strategies becomes second nature to the efficient problem solver.
Under instructions to remember, the mature memorizer employs a variety
of strategies which are not available to the developmentally less mature
individual. These strategies form a hierarchy from simple processes like
labelling and rote rehearsal, to elaborate attempts to extract or impose
meaning and organization on the to-be-remembered material. Indeed, the
outstanding feature of the mature memorizer is the amazing array of complex
transformations he will bring to even the simplest laboratory task (Reitman,
1970). Thus, the extent of developmental differences seems to be determined
by the degree to which increasingly complex strategic skills can be applied.
While it may be possible to distinguish certain basic skills the child must
acquire, once he has mastered these it is no longer possible to define an
optimal strategy on a specific task. The optimal strategy for any one
memorizer will depend on his success or failure with previous strategies,
his estimation of his own capabilities, his creativity, certain personality
variables, in fact, his personal cognitive style.
C) Training Studies
The next major interest to influence the field was a focus on training
studies. This interest was generated both for basic and applied reasons but
originally the impetus came from the importance of the outcome of such studies
for developmental theory. In 1970, Flavell distinguished between two major
deficits the young or retarded child may bring to a memory task. The first is
a mediation deficiency, where the child is unable to employ a potential
mediator (strategy) even when he is specifically instructed to do so. The
hypothetical case in question refers to situations where the potential strategy
is produced but fails to influence performance. A mediational deficiency would
be said to exist if the child could be trained to overtly rehearse items, but
that this activity failed to improve performance. The second type of deficiency
is that of production. A production deficiency is said to be operating when
potential mediators are not produced and hence do not aid performance. Thus,
the child would perform poorly on a memory task requiring rehearsal because
he does not spontaneously employ the rehearsal strategy, although he can be
shown capable of doing so if he were instructed. The training studies were
used to determine whether the child's problems were productional, and hence
could be trained, or mediational and thus would resist training.
In summary of theearly training studies it can be said that although
immature learners display a strategic deficit in a wide variety of memoriza-
tion situations, these deficiences readily respond to training. The problem
appears to be one of production rather than mediation. With even quite
limited training programs immature learners can be induced to attempt a variety
of deliberate mnemonic activities. As it seems that most of the simple
strategies are easily programmable, the possibility of applied value becomes
intriguing.
To determine the degree of success of any training program, it must be
evaluated against three basic criteria of effectiveness: (1) performance
must improve as the result of training, both in terms of accuracy and in terms
of the activities (strategies) used to effect this accuracy; (2) the effects
of this training must be durable; it is obviously desirable to show that
what has been trained can be detected after a reasonable time period has
elapsed; (3) training must result in generalization to a class of similar
situations where the trained activity would be appropriate, for without evidence
of breath of transfer, the practical utility of any training program must be
called into question.
Many of the early studies were successful in demonstrating that training
effectively improved performance; however, considerably more difficulty was
experienced when criteria 2 and 3 were used to evaluate the success of inter-
vention. Although relatively brief instruction would lead to temporarily
improved performance, the less experienced memorizer showed a marked tendency
to abandon a trained strategy when not explicitly instructed to continue in its
use. Several recent studies have shown that more extended training can result
in durability of a trained behavior over a period of months and even years.
The tendency to maintain a trained behavior also appears to be related to
developmental level. Very young or retarded individuals are more likely to
abandon the strategy than are slightly more sophisticated trainees (Brown,
1977).
The criterion of success that presents the most problems is generaliza-
tion, or transfer to appropriate new situations. Although there is some
controversy over what constitutes a suitable transfer task (Belmont &
Butterfield, 1977; Brown, 1977) there is general agreement that evidence for
flexible generalization to new situations is sadly lacking. This inflexibility
in the use of trained skills in new situations is particularly problematic
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when the trainee is a retarded child. Both American and Soviet psychologists,
not to mention parents and teachers, have repeatedly observed the difficulty
mildly retarded children experience with generalization. Indeed it has been
suggested that one of the major problems with slow-learning children is that
they tend to weld new information to the specific situation in which it was
acquired. Successfully training the child to use a simple skill in one
specified situation seems to be well within our competence as instructors;
getting the child to use the information appropriately in other settings appears
to be the major hurdle.
To encapsulate the results to date of training studies aimed at inculcating
rudimentary mnemonic strategies, it would seem fair to say that young, in-
efficient and slow-learning children do not tend to use a variety of simple
memory strategies spontaneously. However, they are production deficient, as
they can be instructed quite easily, and their performance improves. This
improvement can be relatively durable on the specific task used for training.
Flexible use of the skills in new situations is rarely found. Given these
findings the next question concerned why the immature did not use the skills
in the first place, or failed to use them intelligently once shown how. This
led to an interest in the child's knowledge and control of himself as a memorizer,
the currently popular area of metamemory research.
D) Knowledge about Memory-Strategies: Metamemory
Metamemory refers to the knowledge and beliefs one has concerning the
activities of remembering and oneself as a memorizer. While the adult appears
to know a considerable amount about his ability to study and acquire new
information, the young child, in contrast, seems remarkably uninformed about
his own strengths and weaknesses as a studier. In order to concoct a realistic
plan for remembering, the memorizer must be capable of estimating his own
capacity limitations and of realizing the need for some deliberate plan in
11
those situations where his capacity limitation will be exceeded. The
immature learner has difficulty with such requirements for he is generally
not aware of his limitations in deliberate memorization tasks. Over and
above the obvious problem of not knowing how to memorize efficiently, the
young child does not seem to realize that he needs to memorize. He appears
oblivious to the limitations of his memory capacity and unaware that he can
make more efficient use of this limited capacity by strategic intervention
(Brown, 1977; Flavell & Wellman, 1977). A simple concrete example of this
state of ignorance is that children in the early grade school years have
difficulty estimating how many items they will be able to recall from a
supra-span list. They typically overestimate their span and predict that
they can remember all of the presented items. Examples of underestimation
are extremely rare and the incidence of realistic estimation increases
dramatically between kindergarten and fifth grade. If the young child is not
aware of his own limitations it is scarcely surprising that he fails to
initiate a plan to remedy his shortcomings. Flavell and Wellman (1977) have
shown that the young child is not aware of many aspects of himself as a
memorizer, and fails to appreciate the utility of strategies to help make
remembering an easier task.
Such a state of ignorance concerning strategy usage should not seem
surprising given the usual experiences of the preschool child. The young
child is seldom, if ever, required to reproduce exact information or to rote
learn or study. Prior to the school years, the child has existed without a
pressing need to employ deliberate strategies of remembering. He has managed
to acquire a language; he can comprehend an impressive set of conceptual
relations; he can recognize familiar places and people and reconstruct
meaningful events without the need to employ strategies. He can reconstruct
the essential features of his past and deal intelligently with his present.
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It is only when he encounters material which is not inherently meaningful or
must be reproduced exactly that deliberate memorial skills become absolutely
necessary. It takes time for him to recognize that these, in some sense
artificial, situations exist and demand that he respond with something more
than has been required in the past. He must, in fact, recognize that because
of the nature of the material and the need for exact reproduction, he must
apply a deliberate strategy or he will fail to retain the material. When
repeatedly faced with these situations, as he is in school, the child gradually
comes to know more and more about how to remember, and thereby achieves insight
into himself as a memorizer.
E) Summary
In the previous section we have given a brief history of the way
developmental psychologists have set about studying memory strategies. We
know a considerable amount about the development of rudimentary memorization
skills. Young and slow-learning children tend not to use them spontaneously
or even to be fully aware that deliberate intervention on their part is a
prerequisite for efficient performance. Training studies have shown that
a specific deficit can be overcome quite readily but it is unlikely that
the child will think to use a trained skill in appropriate new situations.
As with the original passive behavior which necessitated training in the
first place, this transfer failure is thought to stem from a lack of know-
ledge concerning oneself as a memorizer. Before proceeding to an examination
of the question of what to train we will give two detailed examples of
training programs, which illustrate the general points made in this section.
These are case studies of prototypical programs which illustrate how we arrived
at the general overview given here. In the first case study we will consider
rehearsal as a prototypical strategy of rote recall; in the second we will
consider the problems inherent in attempts to inculcate metamemorial aware-
ness or general skills.
13
III. Rehearsal: A Case Study of a Mnemonic Skill
In its most general sense, rehearsal refers to a wide set of activities
which can be used to maintain information in consciousness for a period of
time. The most frequent form of rehearsal involves continued covert repeti-
tion of the material to be remembered; this activity is useful in at least
two ways. First, if the amount of information to be remembered is relatively
small, it can simply be kept "alive" from its initial presentation until it is
needed. The classic example of this use of rehearsal is the constant repetition
of a telephone number from the time it is first located in a telephone book until
it is actually dialed. Alternatively, if the amount of information is too great
to allow the memorizer to keep it all alive simultaneously, rehearsing portions
of the material together can facilitate the formation of associations between items,
thus enhancing subsequent recall even when rehearsal is terminated a considerable
time prior to the moment of recall. For example, in attempting to remember a
set of 16 items, rehearsing sets of, say, four items together results in much
better recall than not rehearsing, even though not all of the items can be kept
alive until the time when recall is required. Repeating the main points of a
lesson prior to proceeding to the next section involves similar principles.
We have chosen rehearsal as one of our vehicles for a number of reasons.
The main ones result from the fact that rehearsal has been subjected to extremely
close empirical and theoretical scrutiny. As a result, we know a great deal
about the development of rehearsal strategies. We have also learned that this
apparently simple skill turns out to be much more complex, and its usages more
varied and sophisticated, than originally anticipated. As a result, a con-
sideration of rehearsal research highlights the amount of analysis and ingenuity
needed to devise an effective training program. Finally, the major findings in-
volving rehearsal are also applicable to other mnemonic skills (Campione & Brown,
1977), and the statements made in this section can be assumed to be generalizable.
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Training programs generally begin with a theoretical analysis of some
specified task or set of tasks. The aim of this analysis, referred to as a
task analysis, is to specify how the memorizer should perform to maximize his
or her performance. In the examples chosen here, one of the requirements
identified as essential for effective retention is the use of a rehearsal
strategy. Thus, if the target group, in our case slow-learning children, per-
form poorly on the task, it is at least possible that their recall level is
depressed because they fail to rehearse properly, if at all. At this point in
the research program, two questions must be asked. One is whether the task
analysis seems accurate, i.e., whether rehearsal is necessary for efficient per-
formance and whether mature memorizers actually do employ rehearsal strategies
in the task. Assuming that the answer is positive, the second question concerns
whether the target group does in fact fail to employ rehearsal. Assuming another
affirmative answer, it then makes sense to embark upon a rehearsal training pro-
gram.
It should be clear that the investigation of these questions requires the
development of measures of rehearsal usage. Unless we can reliably infer the
presence or absence of rehearsal processes, the research can never really be
started. While a number of measures have been employed, each of them has a
number of associated problems. For example, observation of lip movements has
been used to infer rehearsal activity; however, with older children and adults,
rehearsal processes need not be accompanied by lip movements, thereby preclud-
ing their use in developmental or comparative research. Another common measure
of rehearsal has been the presence of a so-called primacy effect in a number of
recall paradigms. Consider a general case where a number of to-be-recalled items
are presented sequentially, and recall begins immediately after the presentation
of the last item (i.e., there is no appreciable delay between the subject's
seeing or hearing the items and his being asked to recall them). The typical
15
finding with adults is that recall is best for the items from the beginning
of the list (primacy items) and the items at the end of the list (recency items),
and poorest for items in the middle. The recency effect is attributed simply
to the fact that the delay between presentation of these items and their recall
is sufficiently short that these items have not yet faded from the memory of
even the most passive observer. In contrast, the primacy, or initial, items
will have faded from memory unless some activity designed to maintain them has
been carried out by the subject. A favorite theoretical candidate for this
activity is rehearsal, and the appearance of a primacy effect has thus been taken
as evidence for the presence of rehearsal processes. The problem here is that
there are alternative theoretical accounts of the primacy effect which do not
make recourse to rehearsal processes. Thus, primacy need not necessarily in-
dicate rehearsal. This list of potential rehearsal indicators and their attendant
problems could be continued, but hopefully the point is clear.
In our view, the best solution to this problem is to resort to the use of
converging operations, i.e., arrange an experimental situation in which there
are a number of different potential indicators of rehearsal processes. Even
if none of the measures is perfect, if all the indicators agree, we can be much
more confident about any inferences drawn from the data. As an example, in
some research from our own laboratory, as many as four indicators have been
used and found to agree within one experiment (Brown, Campione, Bray, & Wilcox,
1973).
At this point, we should like to describe one research program which has
emphasized the development of a training program. The task employed consists
of having the subject see a series of items (consonants, digits, etc.) pre-
sented in succession in a series of windows. After the last item has been dis-
played, a "probe item" is presented; this is simply a replica of one of the
items the subject has just seen. His task is then to indicate the window in
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which that item had appeared. For example, if the series had been 6 1 2 4 5
3 8, and if the probe item were a 2, the subject should point to the third
window from the left. In a number of experiments, Belmont and Butterfield
(1969, 1971) have modified the task in one important way -- they allow the
subject to determine the rate at which the items are presented. Thus, the
subject presses a button exposing the first item (which remains visible for .5
second) and can then wait as long as he or she wants before proceeding to the
second item, etc. The pattern of pauses, or delays following each item, is
then used as an additional index of rehearsal usage. For example, consider a
six-item list. A likely pattern for a college student might be to proceed
quickly until the fourth item had been exposed, then delay for a much longer
time. Following items 5 and 6, only brief pauses would be observed, with the
probe item being called for immediately. Such a pattern would be taken to in-
dicate that the subject rehearsed the first four items together and then simply
viewed the last two. This strategy, termed a "cumulative rehearsal - fast finish"
strategy, takes cognizance of the fact that the initial items must undergo re-
hearsal to be remembered, whereas the last items will still be alive in memory
even if they are simply viewed without any accompanying activity, as long as the
probe item is exposed quickly.
In this situation, the pause patterns shown by the subjects provide one
source of evidence relevant to the possible use of rehearsal. Using this ana-
lytic procedure, Belmont and Butterfield (1969, 1971) have shown that college
students employ a variety of rehearsal strategies in this task, whereas retarded
adolescents do not. The pause patterns of the retarded subjects are relatively
flat, and pauses after each item tend to be brief. The retarded subjects also
perform more poorly than college students, and their performance is poorest on
the primacy, or initially presented, items. Thus, the overall pattern of their
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recall is nicely consistent with a rehearsal deficiency notion.
When retarded subjects are trained to rehearse, their pause patterns look
like those of college students, their overall recall accuracy increases, and
the increase is most pronounced with the primacy items (Belmont & Butterfield,
1971). In this experiment, the retarded subjects' accuracy increased consid-
erably, showing the beneficial effects of training, but was still well below
that of college students, leading to a further series of experiments (Butterfield,
Wambold, & Belmont, 1973) aimed at refining the training techniques.
To modify the training procedure, a more detailed task analysis served as
the starting point. The specific task involved a six-item series, and the
strategy to be employed consisted of rehearsing the first three items as a set,
and then quickly viewing the last three. The detailed task analysis is shown
in Figure 1. Briefly, the subject first views each of the three initial items,
Insert Figure 1 about here
then pauses and rehearses the set of items a number of times to prepare for
future recall (steps 1 and 2). The second set of three items is then viewed
(step 3), followed immediately by exposure of the probe item (step 4). This
completes the study strategy. Once the probe is exposed, a retrieval plan must
also be adopted, and the plan must conform to the study strategy. As indicated
in step 5, the subject should first attempt to determine if the probe was con-
tained in the second set of items, those which were viewed but not rehearsed.
If it was, the subject responds (step 6); if it wasn't, the search continues to
the set of rehearsed items to determine where the probe item occurred (step 7)
before responding (step 8). What is crucial in the retrieval plan is the order
of search. If the initial, rehearsed set of items is considered first, and if
the probe item is not found there, the subject will be in trouble, as the second
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set of items will have faded from memory. The use of a passive viewing of the
last three items is based on the assumption that the contents of memory will
not have time to fade if the probe comes quickly enough. If, however, the
subject himself imposes a retention interval by searching through the initial
trio of items first, the main rationale for having used such a study strategy
is violated.
In the first experiment reported by Butterfield et al. (1973), retarded
adolescents were taught the "3-3" study strategy, and the result was a clear
improvement in accuracy, from 36% correct to 65% correct. Even with this large
increment, two points were of interest. First, performance was still well below
that obtained with college students, and second, the relation between strategy
use, as measured by pause patterns, and level of recall was not as strong as it
might have been, suggesting the operation of some other factors. A likely
candidate here appeared to be retrieval mechanisms. Training in the first ex-
periment consisted of leading the subjects through steps 1-4 depicted in Figure 1.
The implicit assumption was that steps 5-8 would be adopted spontaneously.
In the next experiments, steps 5-8 were trained explicitly, along with
steps 1-4. As an example of the more detailed training, we take the following
procedure used in their third experiment. In the first phase, the first step
of the study strategy was taught. Each subject was trained to label each of
three items and then to stop and repeat the set three times. They were then re-
quired to count to ten before exposing the probe item and making their response.
After six consecutively correct responses, they proceeded to the next phase.
Here the second half of the study plan was taught, as subjects exposed three
items quickly, called for the probe item, and responded. Thus, the two study
phases were trained separately. Following this, a series of six-item lists was
presented in which the subjects were informed that the probe item would always
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be drawn from the second trio of items. After making their response, they
were further required to repeat the rehearsed items in order. The point of
this part of training was to explicitly teach the subjects to search the
non-rehearsed set first. Finally, they were given a series of trials where
the probe could come from any position, but the instructions to search the
second set of items first were repeated. Following this training and one ad-
ditional refinement, accuracy increased to over 80% correct. In summary, the
"...final performance of these subjects was 114 percent of that obtained from
honretarded adolescents on uninstructed 6-item lists, and 97 percent of that
from nonretarded adolescents given active-passive learning instruction with
6-item lists" (Butterfield et al., 1973, p. 667).
The results of this program indicate clearly that dramatic improvements
in memory performance can be brought about through detailed instruction.
Elation over this success is tempered somewhat by a number of considerations.
First, the development of the final training technique took just over five
years. Second, it is not clear how long-lasting the effects of training might
be. At the longest retention interval tested, 1 week, performance was
significantly lower than immediately following training, although it remained
above untrained levels. This is probably not a problem, as long-lasting effects
of rehearsal training have been obtained by Brown, Campione, and Murphy (1974).
The trained subjects from an earlier experiment by Brown et al. (1973) were
re-tested six months after the original training, and eight of the 10 subjects
continued to rehearse. The training afforded subjects in the original ex-
periment was extensive, stretching over 12 days, and durable effects of training
apparently can be expected if the amount of training is sufficiently great.
Much more problematic, however, are questions concerning the generalized
effects of training. That is, can any effects of training be detected on anything
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other than the specific task on which training occurred? Unless the answer
is affirmative, the effects are sufficiently limited that they may not be of
any instructional interest. While there has not been much relevant research
to date, the indications are not promising. For example, the subjects in the
Brown et al. research were given a generalization test after the six-month
retention test. The training and generalization tasks, while different, are
similar in a number of ways. In the training task, the subjects were shown
a series of four items, each from a different category, and were then cued
with a category name and asked to recall the item from that category. They
were specifically taught to rehearse the first three items together and then
just to view the fourth one. The generalization task was the same as the task
employed in the Belmont-Butterfield research just described. On this task, we
could discern no effects due to training. No signs of rehearsal were obtained,
and the trained subjects performed at exactly the same level as a control group
given no training at all originally. Thus, while the subjects continued to
rehearse six months after training as long as the task remained the same, the
introduction of a different task eliminated the benefits of training.
IV. Training Metamemory
The disappointing lack of convincing evidence of broad generalization of
a trained mnemonic strategy indicated a poor prognosis for obtaining general
educational benefits from such exercises. Training efforts were subsequently
directed at general determinants of performance (such as metamemory) rather
than specific skills or strategies. Instead of training only one domain-
specific heuristic such as rehearsal, it seemed more profitable to direct train-
ing attempts at the development of knowledge concerning strategies in general.
Procedurally, it is difficult to conceive of a method of inculcating knowledge
concerning strategy use in individuals who lack even the rudimentary strategies
which could form the basis of this knowledge. Yet, if we are interested in
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effecting improvement in the child's general performance on a variety of
similar tasks, we must consider both the specific gains from training (trained
strategy use) and the general benefits (improved knowledge concerning memory
tasks, leading to flexible strategy use).
To investigate the feasibility of this alternate approach, a series of
training studies concerned with metamemorial knowledge were conducted with
educable retarded children (Brown,1977; Campione & Brown,1977). As in our case
studies we have taken two programs conducted in our laboratory, one which was
unsuccessful in terms of generating transfer and one which is showing early
signs of success. We will begin with the unsuccessful attempt, give reasons
why the attempt failed and then proceed to the more hopeful program.
A) Predicting One's Own Memory Span
As there were no data concerning educable retarded children's metamnemonic
efficiency at the initiation of this research program, our investigations began
with a very simple form of awareness - the ability to estimate how many items
one can remember. This awareness must underlie subsequent attempts to introduce
strategies for if the child is not aware of the limitations of his ability to
rote learn lists of items, he can scarcely be expected to introduce steps to
remedy his shortcomings.
The basic task was one adapted from a study conducted with normal grade school
children (Flavell, Friedrichs & Hoyt,1970) who were asked to estimate their re-
call span for lists of up to ten pictures. On each trial, from one to ten items
were presented (one on the first trial, two on the second, etc.) and the child's
task was to indicate at each list length whether he could still recall each item
on that list. Over half of the nursery and kindergarten children predicted that
they could recall even ten pictures, the largest number presented, an unrealistic
estimate even for an adult, whereas only a few of the older children overestimated
their ability. If as a measure of realistic evaluation we take an estimation of
the actual span plus or minus two, the group mean met this criterion at the second
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and the fourth grade levels but not at the younger ages. The majority of
younger children dramatically overestimated their span.
The procedure we followed (Brown, Campione & Murphy,1977) was essentially
similar. Two groups of inexperienced slow learning children (MAs = 6 and 8,
IQs = 69 and 72 respectively) were shown several arrays of ten pictures (ex-
posed simultaneously) and asked to predict how many they would be able to
recall on each of these sets. Mean predictions were then compared with their
(subsequently determined) mean actual recall. Individuals whose estimates were
within two items of their actual recall were termed realistic estimators; those
whose guesses were more than two items in error were termed unrealistic estimators.
Only 31% of the older children and 21% of the younger ones could be classed as
realistic, with the remainder overestimating their performance levels (most pre-
dicted they could recall all ten).
All children were then given two days of training, where, for many trials,
they were required to estimate their performance and then to recall. For half
the participants at each MA level, explicit feedback was given reminding them of
their prediction and indicating visually (displaying the numbers on an abacus)
and verbally ("that was good, you got four right that time") the number of items
they had actually recalled. This feedback was given following each estimation-
recall series. The remaining children predicted and recalled an equal amount,
but no explicit feedback was provided. After training was completed, three post-
tests were given, each consisting of multiple assessment trials, the first one day
after training, the second two weeks after training, and the third approximately
one year after original pretesting.
In Figure 2 are the main data of interest, those obtained from the originally
Insert Figure 2 about here
unrealistic children. Students classed as realistic initially remained so throughout
---------------------------~~~~~··~·· ~ 1~·-·--- 
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the experiment. Luckily our training did not cause them to regress.
Considering the first posttest, 65% of the older individuals became realistic
independent of the feedback condition. Of the younger trainees, 62% of those
given explicit feedback became realistic, whereas only 9% of those not given
feedback improved the point of being realistic. Looking at the data from post-
test 2, the older individuals remained unchanged; 60% were still realistic, and
there was no effect of the feedback variable. However, for the younger children,
only 18% of those given feedback remained realistic, and none in the no-feedback
group could be classed as realistic. Thus, considering the performance of the
older children on only the first two posttests, training, with or without explicit
feedback, is sufficient to bring about realistic estimation, and the effect is
found two weeks later. The pattern obtained with the younger students contrasts
sharply; there is significant improvement on the first posttest only when explicit
feedback is provided during training, and even in this case, the effects are not
durable, as the proportion of realistic estimators drops from .62 on posttest 1
to .18 on posttest 2. The effect of providing explicit feedback for the older
children is illustrated only on the final posttest, one year after training.
The proportion of realistic estimators remains unchanged in the feedback condition,
whereas for those not given feedback during training, only 20% remain realistic.
The results of this initial experiment indicate that mildly retarded children
have problems estimating their own performance. It also seems clear that, for
the younger children, information about their performance needs to be explicit
before it will have any effect, and that continual prompting may be necessary to
maintain efficiency. Also, a clear developmental trend was found regarding the
durability of training effects. Whereas training had a relatively durable effect
with the older children, the effects with the younger ones were extremely short-
lived.
The older children did however, show evidence of impressive maintenance of
training as, one year later, 56% of the trainees were still performing effectively.
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Therefore, we decided to apply our third criterion of success and test for
generalization. One major problem for researchers in this area, however, is
the selection of a suitable transfer task. The problem is that unless the
investigator fully understands all facets of his transfer task he would not
be in a position to interpret failures to find generalization. Such failure
could be the result of the trainee's inability to see the relation of the
trained behavior to the new task, the usual interpretation, or it could be
because the trainee could not perform some other component of the transfer
task which would impede his ability to apply the trained behavior even if he
thought to do so (Belmont & Butterfield,1977; Brown,1977; Campione & Brown,
1974).
The dilemma is difficult to deal with for a variety of reasons, which
need not concern us here; however, we have adopted a pragmatic approach. We
choose tests of generalization which seem reasonable to us intuitively, and
judge our intuitions to be successful if those children who spontaneously
adopt the target strategy prior to any training also attempt to use it on the
class of tasks used for transfer, i.e., the training and transfer tasks both
elicit the strategy in natural users.
The principal generalization task (there were several others) given to the
children in the span estimation project consisted of a test for estimation of
recall of numbers rather than pictures. The children were shown twenty 10-item
cards each containing the numbers 1 to 10. Ten of the cards contained the
numbers in numerical order, the remaining cards contained the numbers in a ran-
domized order. The subjects went through the 20 cards and indicated how many
they would be able to recall on each; then, actual recall was assessed on both
types of materials. Thus two sets of cards were used, organized and disorganized.
Predicting 10 items on an organized list (e.g., the numbers in serial order)
could be a realistic estimate, while predicting this many would be unrealistic
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for the random lists. For this reason we considered the two list types separately.
The data from random lists only are presented in Table 1. Consider first the
originally unrealistic subjects. Clearly there is no evidence of generalization
following training on the highly similar 10-item picture task. The proportion
Insert Table 1 about here
of realistic subjects is low for both the MA6 and MA8 groups and the number of
children predicting that they could recall all ten (10 guessers) is very high.
Consider next the originally realistic subjects. Here the picture is quite
different. The mean difference scores (predicted vs. actual) for both MA6 and
MA8 children fall within the realistic range of plus or minus two. Approximately
two-thirds of the originally realistic children are also realistic on the number
generalization tests and the number of 10 guessers is low.
Turning to predictions on the organized lists, a similar pattern emerges.
The proportion of children who accurately predict they will recall 9 or 10 items
(e.g., appreciate the organization of the lists) is .67 and .58 for the originally
realistic MA6 and MA8 subjects. Of the originally unrealistic subjects, no young
child, and only .26 of the older children, do this.
As with prior training studies concerned with specific mnemonic skills (see
rehearsal), our first systematic attempt to find generalization was less than
encouraging. Those subjects originally realistic on the training task did show
transfer to a variety of generalization tasks (we have not described all of them
here), which suggests that the tasks themselves were adequate tests of transfer;
however, the trained subjects were not so flexible. It should be noted that the
generalization tasks were highly similar to the training task; in all, the basic
requirement was to estimate one's own span for various types of 10-item lists.
All consisted of very mild changes from the training task, but still there was
no evidence of generalization even in the older subjects.
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The negative outcome obtained here caused us to think more about the
kind of skills we were attempting to train. It is likely that, as with
rehearsal, the ability to predict one's rote memory capability is of limited
generality or applicability. It may be the case that such activities are less
likely to be generalized than more context-free strategies, and it was
to this type of activity that we turned next.
B) Predicting Readiness for Recall
In the second somewhat more successful training program (Brown & Barclay 1976;
Barclay & Brown,1976) we focused on a very simple general strategy which could
reasonably be supposed to have a wide range of application. Basically, we
attempted to train a "stop-check-and-study" routine. The specific task used,
one of assessing readiness to recall, was also adapted from Flavell's original
work with normal children (Flavell et al.,1970). On each of a series of trials,
the child is given a list of pictures equal to one and one half times the mean
number he actually recalled during a series of practice trials (e.g., 1½ times his
span). He is instructed to continue studying the items until he is sure he can
remember all of them perfectly, and then signal the experimenter when he is
ready. Judging recall readiness for supra-span lists is an intriguing task for
it demands a complex form of self-evaluation, involving both the use of a specific
mnemonic strategy (introduced to effect learning) and the ability to monitor
its success; to both behave strategically and to "self-test" the success of the
strategy in order to terminate study activity. In addition, it requires not only
the ability to differentially study difficult items, another metamemory ability
sensitive to cognitive maturity (Brown & Campione, 1976), but it also requires
that the subject engage in self-testing activities to determine which are the
difficult items.
Not surprisingly immature children performed very poorly on the initial pre-
testing phase of the study. Only 4% of an MA6 sample and 12% of an MA8 sample
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gave even one perfect recall. This indicates poor performance considering the
children were allowed as much time as they wanted. One reason why the develop-
mentally young perform so poorly on this task could be that they do not tend to
introduce strategies of deliberate memorization, such as rehearsal and antici-
pation, involving self-testing elements, which would alert them to their
readiness for a test. If children do not use such self-testing devices, they can
hardly be expected to monitor their own stage of learning.
For this reason we trained groups of children in the use of three strategies
of remembering: anticipation and rehearsal, both of which involve self-testing
elements; and labeling, which does not. The labeling condition essentially
served as a control treatment. All were required to go through each list once,
naming each picture. This labeling trial was followed by a series of three more
trials on which the procedures differed between the groups. Those in the antici-
pation group were trained to anticipate the next picture by saying its name be-
fore exposing it. The rehearsal subjects were trained to rehearse the items
in sets of three (cat, shoe, cup, cat, shoe, cap, etc.). Finally, the label
group was told to go through the list three more times, labeling each item. All
groups were further encouraged to continue with the instructed activity until
they were sure they could recall all items. Training was continued for two days.
Following training, four posttests were given, a prompted posttest (one day
after training) on which individuals were instructed to continue the trained
strategy, and three unprompted posttests given one day, approximately two weeks,
and approximately one year later. The main results are shown in Figure 3 which
gives the percent of correct recall averaged across many trials.
Insert Figure 3 about here
The break in the curve between posttests 3 and 4 indicates that not all individuals
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were retested on the final posttest; however, 78% of the MA 6 and
90% of the MA8 children were available for retesting one year after the start
of the study. As can be seen, both the younger and older children in the
anticipation and rehearsal groups perform significantly better on the prompted
posttest (posttest 1) than on the pretest. Additionally, if we consider the
anticipation and rehearsal groups, 72% of younger subjects recalled perfectly
on at least one trial, compared with none on the pretest; the corresponding
figures for the older subjects are 92% on posttest 1 compared with 8% on the pre-
test. Thus, training the useful self-testing strategies results in both en-
hanced performance (percent recall data) and improved monitoring (data on number
of perfect recalls), compared with the control labeling group.
The MA6 and MA8 groups differed considerably on the last three (unprompted)
posttests. For the younger group, performance on posttests 2, 3, and 4 was
not significantly different from the pretraining level, whereas for the older
group, performance on all posttests differed significantly from the pretraining
level. Thus, as in previous studies concerned with direct training of a strategy,
training facilitates performance, with the effect being somewhat durable for the
older children but transitory for the younger ones.
The younger child's dependency on continual prompting was particularly well-
illustrated on the one-year follow-up tests, which consisted of four days of
testing. On the two initial days, the children were given unprompted post-
tests identical to the previous unprompted tests, and it is these data that are
included in Figure 3. On the third day, the experimenter reverted to the prompt-
ing procedure, demonstrating and reminding the child of his trained strategy and
urging its continued use. The fourth day of the one-year follow-up was a further
unprompted posttest. These data are included in Table 2. Note that both the
Insert Table 2 about here
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younger and older children benefit from the prompting although the effect
is less dramatic for the older children who were performing quite adequately
without the prompts. Of main interest is the failure of the younger children
to maintain their enhanced performance on the final nonprompted test. With-
out continual prompting, the younger children show little evidence of the
effects of intensive training.
Given the poor performance of the younger group we made no attempt to
test these children for evidence of generalization. The older children looked
more promising, however, so we decided to see whether they would show the
benefits of the recall readiness training on quite a different task. Syste-
matically studying material until it is judged to be well enough known to risk
a test, is, of course, a very general strategy, as any student could attest.
Therefore, we were hoping that even with very different materials, the children
who had received extensive training would show some generalized benefits.
The transfer task selected was one which we believed to be more representative
of the type of study activity required in the classroom. Most studying requires
the student to extract the main ideas of prose passages and regurgitate the
gist of the ideas in his own words. Our question was, would training recall
readiness on the simple rote-list learning task help children on the more typical
school study activity? We reasoned that if we could find transfer under these
conditions our training would really have practical utility; if we did not,
we could always revert to less ambitious transfer tasks, those more like the
training vehicle. It should be admitted, however, that before expending the
valuable trained population, we did ascertain that a few selected children were
performing very efficiently on our optimal transfer task.
The data are still being analyzed but we can give the main flavor of the
results here. There were four groups of subjects, the older children who had
been trained in the three groups, anticipation, rehearsal, and labeling, and
a new group of children matched for IQ, MA, and reading scores with the trained
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subjects, and, in fact, selected from the same special education classrooms
as the previously trained students. All students were reading at second to
fourth grade level. The two successfully trained groups, anticipation and re-
hearsal, who had shown evidence of correctly estimating their readiness to
recall were the groups from which we hoped to obtain transfer. The new students
formed an obvious control group which would enable us to compare our trained
children to others who shared important characteristics (age, IQ, class place-
ment, reading scores) with the experimental groups, but had not received train-
ing. The fourth group, labeling, also served an important control function.
They had been in as many sessions as our experimental groups and had interacted
with the tester just as much, but they had not been trained in successful recall
readiness, and had not improved notably above pretraining levels.
All students received six days of testing. On each day they were given
two stories of approximately 100 words each, the stories were of second grade
reading difficulty. On each trial the students read the story through with the
experimenter and received help with any words they did not know. They were then
told to continue studying the story until they were sure that they could retell
the main events in their own words. During their study time the tester recorded
any overt activity and the amount of time taken before the child indicated he
was ready to test his memory.
To date we have compiled two indices of performance, the mean total study
time and the mean number of words recalled. The second measure is only an in-
dication of efficiency and we are currently scoring the number of idea units re-
called, the usual practice in studies such as these (some people can effectively
give the gist of an idea in far fewer words than others).
The major data of interest are given in Table 3. Both the amount of time
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Insert Table 3 about here
spent studying and the number of words recalled were significantly greater
in the two trained groups than in the two control groups. Those children who
successfully maintained adequate recall readiness for a list learning task
appeared to show the benefits of this training on a prose learning task, our
first evidence of successful generalization.
Because of the importance of these data we are currently analyzing the
results in greater depth and replicating the main features of the experiment.
One additional indication of successful transfer which we will consider more
fully is our first crude classification of the observed external study behaviors.
The proportion of children showing any evidence (even once on twelve stories)
of a few broad classes of activities relevant to studying, are also shown in
Table 3. Such activities included underlining, circling key words, writing
notes, rereading, self-testing, lip movements, etc. Even though evidence for
strategic study activities was generally scarce, the difference between the
trained and untrained groups was again apparent, with two-thirds of the trained
children showing some relevant activity compared with one-third of the un-
trained subjects.
V. Practical Implications of Training Studies
Although we have concentrated on a few research programs, the information
obtained from them is fairly representative of the state of the art. Now the
question is, what, if anything can be learned from these basic research programs
that could have any implications in terms of guiding educational practices?
First let us consider the successes achieved so far by training studies.
We know a considerable amount about how to train basic memory strategies. Some
improvement in performance tends to follow even quite cursory intervention.
-------------------------------
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When detailed task analysis of the type introduced by Butterfield, Wambold,
and Belmont, are employed, one can effect dramatic improvement, such that
retarded persons perform at least as well as untrained adults. The success
of such detailed task analysis for effecting improvement is most encouraging.
At this point, however, it seems reasonable to consider the desired outcome
of training. If the aim of training is to see how close to mature performance
one can render children's behavior, the detailed task analysis approach is
highly successful. Theoretically such data are invaluable for they demonstrate
that one pervasive interpretation of a developmental deficit, the smaller capacity
interpretation mentioned earlier, is incorrect. For if training fails, one
should not implicate some fundamental capacity limitation of the child but
attempt to refine training. Practically, the task analysis approach is invaluable,
if the desired end-product is to improve performance on the training task.
Gold's (1972) work with severely retarded individuals is an excellent case in
point. Severely and profoundly retarded institutionalized people can be quickly
trained to perform complex assembly jobs, if the task is broken into easily
manageable subunits, an intelligent task decomposition achieved through detailed
task analyses. The goal of the training procedure is to achieve quick, error-
less performance on the training task, for, armed with this skill the hitherto
unemployable individual can earn a living wage.
The aim of those engaged in cognitive instruction is generally assumed to
be somewhat different. Rather than regarding the goal as excellent performance
on a specific isolated task, the desired end-product is to effect a general
improvement in understanding which would be reflected on a whole class of similar
tasks, a much more demanding specification. This aim can again be defended both
theoretically and practically. Theoretically, one could argue that without
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evidence of broad transfer, training may have resulted in the mastery of a
rote rule, but may not have produced any real change, or general advancement in
the child's knowledge of the world (Kuhn, 1974). Demonstrating adult-like
performance on a single task is sufficient evidence for those who are interested
in proving that intellectual immaturity is not necessarily an impediment to
efficiency on any one specific task. However, there are strong reasons to be-
lieve that there are limitations to the young thinker's ability to reason. If
this is true, mere training on a rote response will not affect this ability until
an appropriate level of cognitive maturity is reached. Intellectual growth
may be accelerated, but training can achieve only a small increment (Inhelder,
Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974). Within the memory training field, advocates of this
more conservative position look for generalization as the index of successful
training. As we have seen the evidence for generalization following training
on specific mnemonic strategies, such as rehearsal, is less than impressive.
And the cost of such training programs is great, the rehearsal training
program of Belmont and Butterfield took years to complete as did the early
metamemory training programs from our laboratory. If the aim is to bring
children up to adult levels of performance on a particular task the Belmont and
Butterfield program has succeeded admirably; but, if as a result the trainees
do not evidence the effect of training in any situation other than the training
vehicle, one must question the practical utility of what has been trained. In
terms of cost effectiveness, the prognosis for educational gains from such pro-
grams appears limited, interesting as they are from a theoretical standpoint.
We would like to argue that in order to justify such detailed task analyses,
efficiency in the skill that is the subject of training should be an end result
in itself. There are two situations where this would be the case. The first
is where mastery on the trained task is itself of great practical use, even in
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the absence of any generalization. An example of such a program would be Gold's
assembly task training for severely retarded individuals. A second case where
it would be worth the detailed task analyses approach is if the skill trained
is by definition applicable to a great range of situations, for example,
reading. Attempts to apply task analysis approaches to beginning reading skills
have been less successful than one would like, largely because we do not under-
stand the reading process clearly. Yet few would deny the practical utility of
searching for a workable training program for reading, based on thoughtful and
detailed task analyses. Reading, by definition is a generalizable skill, a
perfectly desirable end-product of an intensive training program.
In terms of training strategies of learning and memory, however, the success
of most training programs is limited, if practical outcomes are the main focus.
This failure may result, in part, from the concentration on rote skills. The
very young child seems not to benefit much from explicit training either in a
rote skill or in feedback concerning the limitations of his own memory. The
one hopeful sign has been the successful maintenance and generalization in the
recall readiness task. And this success is particularly illustrative, not only
because of its rarity, but also because the "skill" trained was decidedly
different from those that have been the subject of previous training programs.
The basic requirement in all phases of this program was that the child continue
to study until he felt ready for a test; to stop and wait to respond until some
effort at memory monitoring, or self-testing, had been undertaken. Such behavior
would represent a generally useful strategy, applicable in a wide variety of
study situations, from the practical to the academic.
We would be even more encouraged if we can find generalization to "real-life"
situations. In all future studies we intend to observe trained and untrained
children on classroom and resource room activities where our training skill should
be appropriate to see if, indeed, the training has any worthwhile benefits in
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terms of generalized improvement. To effect this, we intend to train two
general skills, one to half the children and the other to the remainder.
Then we will look for experimental and real-life evidence of maintenance and
generalization, Two skills will be the subject of study so that we can our-
selves generalize about our results and so that children will not be placed
into a no-training group. If our training is going to enhance classroom per-
formance, children should not be denied access to it if possible. We do not
lose experimental rigor, however, for children trained on A should show
generalization of A and can act as a control group for skill B, where they
have not received training. The reverse would be true of the subjects receiving
training on skill B.
We believe that it is time to rethink the types of skills we have attempted
to train. How often does the mature memorizer rehearse? Probably not often.
If children do not generalize a rehearsal strategy because they fail to see
its utility, this could be a realistic appraisal of the enterprise. After all,
they all tell us that they write down telephone numbers (Brown, 1977); one of
the authors writes down telephone numbers.
An alternative strategy would be to train general, metamemory skills, which
could have great generality across a variety of problem-solving situations, skills
such as checking, planning, asking questions, self-testing and monitoring.
These skills are transsituations, i.e., they apply to many forms of problem-
solving activity rather than being restricted to a certain limited task domain.
Indeed, if one is interested in the ecological validity of the processes we
select for study, the skills subsumed under the heading of metacognition (Brown,
1977) do appear to have recognizable counterparts in "real-world, everyday life"
situations. Checking the results of an operation against certain criteria of
effectiveness, economy and common-sense reality is a metacognitive skill applicable
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whether the task under consideration is solving a math problem, memorizing a
prose passage, following a recipe, or assembling a piece of furniture. Self-
interrogation concerning the current state of one's own knowledge during
problem solving is an essential skill in a wide variety of situations, those
of the laboratory, the school, or everyday life.
Thus, the types of cognitive activities which we believe suitable for
intensive intervention should have certain properties, (a) they should have
transsituational applicability, (b) they should readily be seen by the child
to be reasonable activities that work, (c) they should have some counterpart
in real-life experiences, and (d) their component processes should be well
understood so that effective training techniques can be devised. Our bias directs
us to a subset of general metacognitive activities which we feel admirably fit
the prescription, checking, monitoring, and reality testing, etc. This is,
of course, still too ambitious and we would advocate the selection of a few basic
skills for intensive study. The ones we have chosen can be subsumed under the
general heading self-interrogation.
The eventual aim is to train the child to think dialectically, in the sense
of the Socratic teaching method. In the Socratic method, the teacher constantly
questions the students' basic assumptions and premises, plays the devil's advocate,
and probes weak areas, using such techniques as invidious generalizations and
counter-example (Anderson, 1977; Brown, 1977; Collins, 1977). The desired end-
product is that the student will come to perform the teacher's functions for
himself via self-interrogation. Although the sophisticated skills described by
Collins are obviously not directly applicable to young slow-learning children,
the basic principles underlying the approach are. We have begun at the very
simple level of teaching the child to self-interrogate when faced with a certain
class of problems (instructions, math problems, a laboratory task, etc.). The
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type of self-interrogation which we think might work is to provide the
child with a routine set of questions to ask himself before proceeding, e.g.,
(a) stop and think! (b) do I know what to do (i.e., understand the instruction,
both explicit and implicit)? (c) is there anything more I need to know before
I can begin? and (d) is there anything I already know that will help me (i.e.,
is this problem in any way like one I have done before)?
We are currently attempting to train educable retarded children to follow
instructions both verbal and written and to perform a variety of simple prose
comprehension tasks, all in the context of a meaningful activity, like assembling
a toy or following a recipe. In the course of these activities, they must de-
liberately and overtly pass through a self-interrogation routine like the one
described above. We believe that devising simple systems for eliciting self-
awareness and conscious control over one's own activities is an important form
of training because the end-product is desirable in its own right, it should have
transsituational applicability and it should improve both the child's cognitive
and metacognitive skills and his feeling of personal competence and control.
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Table 1
Number Generalization Test, Random Lists
(from Brown, Campione, & Murphy, 1977)
Originally Realistic Originally Unrealistic
No Feedback Feedback
MA 6 MA 8 MA 6 MA 8 MA 6 MA 8
Mean Difference
Score 1.75 1.08 5.09 3.64 5.00 4.42
Proportion
Realistic .67 .75 .09 .28 .08 .25
Proportion
10 Guessers .17 .17 .73 .43 .67 .50
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Table 2
Proportion Correct on Recall-Readiness Posttests (From Brown 1977)
Posttests
Original Data One year follow up
Group Condition No No No No No
Prompt Prompt Prompt Prompt Prompt Prompt Prompt
Anticipation .82 .62 .52 .50 .48 .81 .57
MA 6 Rehearsal .77 .61 .49 .46 .50 .90 .63
Label .60 .56 .55 .46 .58 .78 .54
Anticipation .92 .84 .81 .80 .72 .95 .85
MA 8 Rehearsal .89 .82 .81 .74 .73 .84 .83
Label .74 .65 .63 .60 .61 .67 .63
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Table 3
Recall Readiness Generalization Test
Groups Anticipation Rehearsal Label New
Mean Study
Time (Sec.) 103.7 105.6 57.6 62.4
Mean Number
Words Recalled 57.3 61.7 43.0 40.1
Correlation
of Study Time
and Words
Recalled .89 .67 .56 .94
Proportion
Showing
Some Overt
Study
Activity .67 .64 .40 .29
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Figure Legends
Figure 1. A task analysis of the six-item probed recall procedure
(from Butterfield, Wambold, & Belmont, 1973).
Figure 2. The proportion of unrealistic estimators who become realistic
following training as a function of MA and feedback condition (from Brown,
Campione, & Murphy, 1977).
Figure 3. The proportion of items recalled as a function of mental age,
training condition, and test phase (from Campione & Brown, 1977).
IMPROVING SHORT-TERM MEMORY
uals do not readily adopt strategies that com-
bine passive and active learning. Nonretarded
adults tailor their use of the passive and active
systems to the recall requirements they face.
Thus in a probe task, which allows recall from
the end of the list before recall from the be-
ginning, ndnretarded subjects use the passive
system at the end of the list. But when they
are required to recall a list of letters completely
and in the order in which they were presented,
they confine their use of the passive system to
the formation of rehearsable chunks, and they
use rehearsal at the end as well as at the be-
ginning and in the middle of the lists. Young
children and retarded persons change their
acquisition strategy very little in response to
changing recall task demands. They simply
persist in the use of the passive system despite
its ineffectiveness in many memory situations
(Belmont & Butterfield, 1971b).
Three Applied Experiments
The primary purpose of the three experi-
ments reported here was to teach mildly re-
tarded people to coordinate their use of
the acquisition and retrieval aspects of both
their passive and active memory systems so as
to achieve highly accurate recall in the mem-
ory-probe task described above. All three
experiments employed 6-letter lists. The chief
method was to teach retarded subjects to use
component activities that our previous basic
studies had shown to be associated with ac-
curate recall in this task, namely: (1) use the
passive system to construct a rehearsable
group of the first 3 letters; then (2) transfer
those letters to the active memory store by
rehearsing them; (3) stop attending to those
first 3 letters while exposing and attending to
but not rehearsing the last 3 letters; (4) ex-
pose the probe letter immediately after attend-
ing to the sixth letter; (5) immediately search
the entire contents of the passive memory
store; (6) respond at once if the probe is
found in the passive store; but (7) if not
found, search the active store serially; and
(8) terminate that search by responding when
the probe item is located. These steps are
presented schematically in Figure 2.
Each experiment began with the retarded
subjects performing a series of 6-letter lists
without acquisition or retrieval instructions.
1.
ONSTRUCT REHEARSA3LE
CHUNK (of first 3 letters)
BY ATTENTION ALONE
2.
STORE FIRST CHUNK(fordeloyed retreival)
BY REHEARSAL
~E]~
FIc. 2. The sequence of steps inferred from the
performance of nonretarded adults and used to guide
the memory training procedures in the present experi-
ments. Each step represents a distinct process.
In all of these pretests they paused very little
and recalled very poorly. Following the pre-
tests, they were trained to use different com-
binations of the learning and retrieval steps
outlined in Figure 2. The first experiment
provided two types of training in how to use
the learning processes depicted in Steps 1, 2,
and 3. The second experiment providetd, in
separate sessions, training in the use of the
learning processes represented in Steps 1 and
2 plus the retrieval processes represented in
Steps 5, 6, 7, and 8. Finally, the third experi-
ment provided training in the use and se-
quencing of all eight steps.
Method
Subjects
There were 24 subjects in Experiment 1 and
8 each in Experiments 2 and 3. All were in-
stitutionalized adolescents classified according
to the AAMD system (Heber, 1961) as either
borderline or mildly retarded. They ranged
in age from 13 to 21 and were selected ran-
domly with the restriction that they had to
identify and pronounce correctly the 12 con-
sonants used as stimuli in the experiments.
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